Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer di¤erentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.
Introduction
In many federations around the world the redistribution of a substantial part of national tax revenues to local governments is prescribed by the constitution and based on objective criteria of need, such as population.
1 While the explicit goal of such revenue-sharing mechanisms is to promote inter-regional equity there is both theory and ample evidence to suggest that much public resource allocation is driven by politicians'electoral goals which are unlikely to coincide with stipulated equity goals. The question thus arises whether shielding public resources from political interference through institutional arrangements works in practice. Little is know about this issue because the empirical literature on redistributive politics has generally taken for granted that constitutionally anchored revenuesharing mechanisms are implemented without regard to political considerations.
In this paper I demonstrate that the major constitutionally mandated Brazilian intergovernmental transfer program was circumvented and manipulated for political gain over the 1990's. Speci…cally, I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, as evidenced by their discontinuous distribution around several thresholds determining transfer brackets. The manipulation substantively increased the number of over-classi…ed counties relative to transfer brackets warranted by their actual populations and resulted in economically important transfer di¤erentials. Counties that located above the various population cuto¤s in 1991 received additional transfers of about USD 22 million over the entire decade of the 90s and beyond because coe¢ cients were subsequently grandfathered. 2 For small local governments this transfer di¤erential amounted to about 15% of their public budgets.
An important question is whether this manipulation re ‡ects political interference. In order to distinguish between corruption and technocratic judgement as potential explanations, I evaluate which, if any, of several political economy models outlined below best explain the observed program manipulation. In particular, I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. The …ndings suggest that the main bene…ciaries were right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties. Under the assumption that political fragmentation at the local level proxies for swing constituencies, these results are consistent with the "aligned swing" prediction of Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta's [2008] model. There is also some evidence that intergovernmental transfers were targeted at aligned local executives which is consistent with predictions from the ADDD and Khemani [2007] models.
While little is known about the robustness of attempts to shield public resources from political interference through formal rules, the paper by Khemani [2007] tests the related question whether delegation of …scal policy to an independent agency can mitigate political distortions. Khemani shows that while discretionary federal transfers to aligned states in India were higher relative to non-aligned states over the period 1972-1995, agency determined transfers to aligned states were actually lower. The net e¤ect of center-state alignment on federal transfers was still positive but statistically insigni…cant, i.e. the independent …scal agency substantially o¤set the e¤ects of political manipulation by the national executive.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents institutional background on the revenue sharing mechanism between the federal and local governments in Brazil and provides evidence of program manipulation. Section 3 gives an overview of the literature on electoral incentives and public spending, including the existing literature on Brazil. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 shows how I translate the various predictions of the patronage literature into empirically testable hypotheses given the political and institutional environment in Brazil around 1990. Section 5 also gives details on the estimation approach. Estimation results are presented in section 6. The …nal section concludes with a discussion of the limitations as well as extensions to the analysis presented here.
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Institutional background
In this section, I …rst describe the economic importance and mechanics of the federal revenue sharing fund for municipal governments. I then document a manipulation of the program that occurred with the 1991 population estimates and show that this manipulation substantively increased the number of counties that were over-classi…ed relative to transfer brackets warranted by their actual populations. I also show that the manipulation had economically signi…cant e¤ects on the distribution of revenue sharing funds and discuss why the e¤ects of the manipulation extend to the present day.
Importance and mechanics of revenue sharing
Intergovernmental transfers …nance most of local government spending on primary education, primary health care and local public transportation in Brazil. 3 The most important among these transfers is the Each county is assigned a coe¢ cient c it = c(pop e it ) for the following calendar year based on the step function, c(:); from Table I and its estimated population pop e it : For counties with up to 10188 inhabitants, the coe¢ cient is 0.6, from 10189 to 13584 inhabitants, the coe¢ cient is 0.8 and so forth. The law thus creates discontinuities in FPM transfers at these thresholds. There is a total of 18 population brackets and although the population thresholds were supposed to evolve with population growth in Brazil, they remained unchanged since 1966, as further detailed below.
The coe¢ cient c(pop e it ) determines the share of FPM resources available for state j 3 In 2002, local governments were in charge of 16,6 % of total public revenue [BNDES 2003 ]. 4 Federal Constitution of Brazil, Art. 159 Ib. 4 that are distributed to county i. The amount of transfers to state j in turn depends on a percentage f j of federal tax collection in year t, rev t . The state shares are determined in the constitution and have remained unchanged for decades. For the state of Bahia, for example, the percentage is 9.2695. F P M ijt is the amount transferred to county i in state j during year t as in: The speci…c formula for county population estimates is as follows:
5 where a kj = pop kj80 pop kj70 pop j80 pop j70 k = 1; 2; :::; 20
Since local population estimates directly determine funding levels it is important to verify whether these estimates are indeed derived from the forecasting model described above. Figure 1 plots 1989 o¢ cial population estimates against predicted estimates calculated using the above formula. 5 It is clear from the scatterplot that the formula predicts 1989 o¢ cial population estimates quite well although there is some dispersion around the 45 degree line. The dispersion is related to the fact that the predicted estimates are not based on the same 1970 and 1980 census data that were used at the time o¢ cial estimates were made in 1989. Another and probably more important reason for the dispersion is that origin counties ceded some population to newly created counties. 6 Finally, the dispersion might be related to political manipulation as further discussed below. The important point here, however, is that as a …rst approximation, 1989 predicted estimates track o¢ cial estimates fairly closely.
Evidence on manipulation of population estimates
The …rst empirical fact established in this paper is that this tight link between formuladriven predictions and o¢ cial estimates broke down over the next two years. This point is best demonstrated with the use of two histograms, one for the distribution of 1989 o¢ cial estimates and the other for the 1991 o¢ cial estimates. Figures 2 and 3 document that while the distribution of 1989 o¢ cial estimates is smooth at the thresholds, the distribution of 1991 o¢ cial estimates exhibits gaps immediately below the thresholds determining 5 O¢ cial estimates come directly from reports issued by the Federal Court of Accounts (TCU). 6 In order to obtain forecasts for the newly created and origin counties I would need to know which counties lost territory to the newly created counties as well as access to census tract population numbers from 1980 which are not readily available. 6 transfer brackets and even more obvious spikes immediately above those cuto¤s. 7 The histogram actually understates the discontinuity of the density around the cuto¤s because the spikes occur at speci…c points on the support.
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The total number of counties that were placed on any one of these bunching points is 1870, which represents 42% of the counties receiving FPM transfers at the time. While I was not able to con…rm with IBGE what forecast model they were using in 1991, it seems clear that government o¢ cials did not rely exclusively on some variant of the population forecast model outlined above which is essentially a continuous function of past census information and population projections.
The discontinuous distribution of population estimates is thus almost surely the result of an adjustment which went beyond the mechanical application of the population forecast model.
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The reasons for this manipulation or adjustment of population estimates is less clear.
For example, it is possible that bureaucrats used some administrative rule to determine which estimates to revise. O¢ cials were likely more averse to underestimate a county relative to a given threshold (type I error) than overestimating it (type II error) because underestimated counties were much more likely to appeal against IBGE's preliminary population estimates. Although IBGE has the …nal authority to determine o¢ cial estimates, i.e. there is no external review of IBGE decisions, dealing with county complaints involves scarce administrative resources. Bureaucrats' attempts to preempt such complaints would explain the curious gaps in the distribution of estimates just below the thresholds as well as a part of the spikes just above. One explanation is that all counties within a given distance to the next higher threshold were placed just above the threshold to take account of the uncertainty surrounding the formula based estimates. The mass of missing counties from the gaps to the left of each threshold is too low to account for the mass on the spikes, however. In other words, IBGE o¢ cials must have bumped up counties for other reasons as well.
7 1990 o¢ cial estimates exhibit some bunching though not nearly as stark as the 1991 estimates. 8 The exact bunching points are as follows: 10189, 10298, 13730, 17162, 24027, 30891, 37756, 44620, 51484, 61781, 72078, 82375, 92671, 102968, 116697, 130426, 144155, 157884. 9 1 1 Alternatively, because the formula is in principle known, 1991 …rst-pass estimates could be generated given population data from the time the forecasts were made. This approach is complicated by the fact that new counties were created since the last census in 1980. In order to obtain 1991 forecasts for the newly created and origin counties I would need to know which counties lost territory to the newly created counties as well as access to census tract population numbers from 1980. Unfortunately these data are not readily accessible. 8 stantively increased the number of mis-classi…ed counties from 33.36% to 47.85% (bracket error 6 = 0) due to a higher number of over-classi…cations which more than o¤set a reduction in under-classi…cations compared to the 1989 estimates. Tables III and IV show that the entire mis-classi…cation di¤erence is driven by the manipulated counties, i.e. those locating on any one of the bunch points identi…ed above. Overall results presented so far suggest that the information used to revise the formula-driven estimates was not a good predictor of actual levels of population in 1991. It is also worth pointing out that manipulation may not have been limited to the bunched counties. Similarly, the 1991 manipulation may not have been an isolated incident. Even prior to 1991 there might have been more subtle manipulations of the program, which left the distribution of population estimates smooth at the cuto¤s.
Economic signi…cance of the manipulation
The 1991 manipulation resulted in signi…cant transfer di¤erentials. Counties that located above the various population cuto¤s in 1991 received additional transfers of about USD 22 million over the entire decade of the 90s and beyond because coe¢ cients were subsequently grandfathered.
12 For small local governments this transfer di¤erential amounted to about 15% of their public budgets. Grandfathering began in 1992 when all coe¢ cients remained virtually unchanged, partly because census results had not been available by the end of 1991. When census population estimates were …nally released in 1993, the majority of counties would have had their coe¢ cients reduced because the law stipulated that the thresholds be adjusted with population growth and these counties had grown less than the population average for Brazil. Some counties would have incurred a signi…cant loss of transfers as a result of this reclassi…cation [Brandt 2002 ].
Another law was approved in April 1993, still by the same congress, which determined that both coe¢ cients and population thresholds were to be maintained without adjustment. 13 The only exception was for counties that were subdivided and lost population to newly-created counties. The revision of coe¢ cients for these types of counties was done according to the existing population thresholds using the latest census population estimate. Underestimated counties'coe¢ cients were updated pursuant to the publication of the census while overestimated counties'coe¢ cients were not. It is not clear whether this adjustment was legal, given the language of supplementary law n o 74/1993.
In 1996, there was a population count carried out by IBGE and the two houses of parliament approved another supplementary law at the end of 1997. It stated that in 1998 all coe¢ cients of the FPM were to remain the same as in 1997.
14 From 1999 onwards however, coe¢ cients would be based on the 1996 population count and the grandfathering would be phased out over the next …ve years. In each year, coe¢ cients of counties that had bene…ted from the grandfathering would be reduced by 20% of the excess coe¢ cient, the di¤erence between the grandfathered coe¢ cient and that resulting from current popu- 
In March 2001 a new supplementary law was enacted in order to postpone full adjustment to 2008. 15 The 1991 manipulation thus extends its e¤ects to the present day.
To sum up this section, there is clear evidence that the 1991 o¢ cial population estimates were somehow adjusted or manipulated. The adjustments resulted in economically important transfer di¤erentials extending up to the present day because coe¢ cients were grandfathered in 1992. The fact that the manipulation of county population estimates doc-umented above signi…cantly increased the number of mis-classi…ed counties casts doubts on technocratic explanations. The remainder of the paper turns to political explanations of the program manipulation.
Theory and evidence of distributive politics
Both theory and evidence suggest that public resource allocation is at least partly driven by politicians'electoral goals. Whether institutional arrangements restricting the scope of political discretion work in practice is an open empirical question. In this section I …rst review the theoretical political economy frameworks most relevant for the allocation of intergovernmental grants. I then discuss the existing empirical work on discretionary transfers, including the literature speci…c to Brazil.
Single decision-maker models: theory
Most theoretical models considered here assume that decision-makers design income redistribution platforms to maximize expected vote totals. Di¤erent predictions regarding optimal redistribution platforms arise as a result of alternative assumptions about the extent and riskiness of various groups'responsiveness to particularistic bene…ts and politicians'degree of risk-aversion [Cox and McCubbins 1986] , or the strength of groups' ideological preferences and parties'relative abilities to e¢ ciently target bene…ts to particular groups [Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Dixit and Londregan 1996] . In the Cox and
McCubbins model, risk averse politicians are thought to reward their core constituents relative to opposition or uncommitted groups, while candidates with more appetite for risk should actively court uncommitted groups. 16 In the Dixit and Londregan model, parties without a relative advantage to e¢ ciently redistribute bene…ts but facing groups that are heterogeneous in terms of ideological preferences are expected to target those groups with weak ideological preferences relative to private consumption. Such groups are referred to as swing voters in their model. Alternatively, if parties do di¤er in how e¢ -ciently they manage to distribute bene…ts across groups, the model predicts asymmetrical redistribution platforms targeted at parties'respective core constituencies.
A central assumption in these models is that parties are able to claim credit for the bene…ts they deliver. When bene…ts take the form of unrestricted budgetary transfers from the central to local governments it seems reasonable to expect that credit-claiming for the central incumbent is less than perfect because at least some of the credit for higher spending goes to the party in power at the local level. Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta [2008] , ADDD for short, explicitly allow for credit-claiming imperfections in their model and derive predictions for the redistributive policies of a vote maximizing incumbent party at the center when ideological preferences of local constituencies are heterogeneous and the political orientation of state governments might be di¤erent from the orientation of the incumbent party at the center.
Their …st prediction is that when the incumbent at the center receives little or no direct political credit for transferring funds to local governments it should skew the distribution of resources towards aligned local governments, i.e. local governments ruled by the same party as the party at the center ("alignment e¤ect"). Doing otherwise promotes the interests of the non-aligned ruling party at the local level at the expense of the central incumbent. When the potential for credit claiming for the center is low, the authors also argue that among aligned state governments, those with a higher proportion of swing voters should be favored ("aligned swing e¤ect"), while among non-aligned governments swing communities should be discriminated against ("unaligned swing e¤ect"). 17 Khemani
[2007] also presents a model with the same basic assumptions as in ADDD but focusing on party popularity instead of swing status and assuming zero credit-claiming ability for the center. Her model also predicts that the central government should skew the distribution of resources towards aligned state governments. The model makes no …rm predictions about the e¤ect of party popularity but predicts that party popularity should only matter for aligned states.
Executive-legislative bargaining models: theory
A …nal set of predictions relate to legislative coalition-building in presidential systems such as Brazil. Brazilian presidents face the di¢ cult task of building legislative support in an extremely fragmented Congress in order to pass legislation. Ames [1995a Ames [ , 1995b argues that presidential coalition-building strategies are at least in part based on deputies trading votes for discretionary grants from the federal executive. Such grants necessarily ‡ow to individual local governments, however, while deputies compete for votes in their entire state. Any given county thus contributes votes to multiple deputies which makes it di¢ cult for any one of them to claim credit for the federal …nancial support he helped to attract. This is particularly true for the unrestricted budget transfers that are the focus of this analysis.
Ames [1995a, 1995b] discusses the incentives presidents and federal deputies face under such electoral rules and argues that deputies are more likely to trade votes for grants with the executive when they dominate a county's votes or at least face limited competition from within their own and other parties because this makes credit-claiming easier. On the other hand, Ames argues that high interparty competition might re ‡ect weak ideological preferences and a community susceptible to particularistic bene…ts, provided that the deputy …nds a way to claim political credit through an alliance with the local executive for example. The predicted e¤ect of interparty fragmentation on redistribution is thus ambiguous. It seems reasonable to speculate, however, that alliances between deputies and local mayors are more likely to happen if they share the same political orientation.
Such alliances, in turn make it more likely for a deputy to trade his vote for presidential favors. Similarly, deputies sharing the ideology of the president are more likely to be part of his legislative coalition [Arretche and Rodden 2004] .
Single decision-maker models: evidence
The major problem for empirical testing of the types of models discussed above is that predictions hinge on rarely observed measures of politicians'risk aversion, parties'relative 13 e¢ ciency in distributing bene…ts to particular groups, the strength of groups'ideological preferences and ease of credit-claiming for favors dispensed. Given the various ways the theoretical concepts have been operationalized for empirical testing and given the di¤erences in political institutions across countries it is not surprising that no general empirical regularities have emerged from this literature.
Some studies of distributive politics …nd that politicians tend to reward their core constituents as measured by the proportion of votes in a district that go to the party in power at the center. Levitt and Snyder [1995] show that the Democratic vote share is an There are also a number of empirical papers that deal with distributive politics in 14 Brazil. Ames [1995a] demonstrates that federal deputies in the 1987-1990 legislature were more likely to make amendments to the national budget in counties where their individual vote share in the previous election was high. He also …nds that deputies target vulnerable municipalities, i.e. municipalities where incumbent deputies retired, in-migration was high and interparty and intraparty fragmentation were high. Similarly, Finan [2003] investigates federal deputies' amendments to the national budget over the entire legislative cycle 1995-1998 and …nds that they tend to reward municipalities for past electoral support. Arretche and Rodden [2004] …nd that those states which provided more votes in past presidential elections received more intergovernmental transfers over the period 1991-2000.
In addition to rewarding direct electoral support, presidents may also reward local mayors for their endorsement in the presidential race [Ames 1994 ].
Recent evidence from the Indian federation also suggests that central governments attempt to skew the distribution of resources towards aligned state governments, i.e. state governments ruled by the same party as the party at the center. Speci…cally, ADDD [2008] …nd that alignment matters for the allocation of project-speci…c discretionary grants in India over the period 1974-1997 but only in those states where the proportion of close state constituent elections was relatively high. The proportion of close national constituent elections does not seem to matter, irrespective of center-state alignment. Khemani [2007] on the other hand …nds that over essentially the same time period, aligned states receive more general purpose grants irrespective of the closeness of previous state legislature elections. Khemani's results suggest, however, that among aligned states those with a lower share of national assembly delegates a¢ liated with the ruling party at the center receive more discretionary transfers while among non-aligned states party popularity does not seem matter. The national ruling party's popularity in state legislatures does not seem to matter either, irrespective of center-state alignment.
Executive-legislative bargaining models: evidence
There is substantive evidence that Brazilian presidents use public resources to garner legislative support. Ames [1995b] 
Data
The data used in this study come from a variety of sources. O¢ cial population estimates stem from successive reports issued by the federal court of accounts (TCU 
Hypotheses and estimation approach
The main goal of this paper is to evaluate which, if any, of the political economy theories outlined above best explain the observed program manipulation. In this section I …rst discuss how I translate the various predictions into empirically testable hypotheses given the political and institutional environment in Brazil around 1990. I then give details on the estimation approach.
Hypotheses
The …rst prediction adapted from the models by ADDD [2008] and Khemani [2007] is that aligned counties, i.e. those that were governed by mayors a¢ liated with parties of the ruling coalition at the federal level, were more likely to obtain population estimates above a given threshold and hence receive more federal money than non-aligned counties. Both ADDD and Khemani emphasize that this prediction rests on the assumption that the incumbent party at the center receives little or no credit for the …nancing of local public services. When the transfers are for unrestricted local budget support, as in the Brazilian case and with the general purpose transfers analyzed by Khemani, it seems reasonable to expect that this condition obtains.
Determining allied parties and hence center-local alignment in Brazil's fragmented party system is somewhat di¢ cult, however. It is even more complicated during Collor's presidency from 1990 until 1992 since he did not enter into formal coalitions with other parties until the end of his term. Observers agree, however, that he needed to rely on legislative support from right-wing parties, PDS and PFL in particular, in order to pass legislation [Ames 1995b [Ames , 2001 ]. Other right-wing parties at the time included the PL, the PDC and the PTB. In the empirical analysis below I refer to aligned counties as those headed by mayors a¢ liated with any of these political parties. Table V 
Estimation approach
The main goal of this paper is to evaluate whether and how FPM transfers were manip- Before presenting estimation results it is useful to brie ‡y discuss the expected signs on the parameters in equation 3. The common prediction from the ADDD and Khemani models is that 1 > 0. The Khemani model further predicts 2 = 0 and leaves 3
indeterminate while the ADDD model predicts 4 < 0 and 5 > 0. As discussed in section 3.2 above, the predicted e¤ect of interparty fragmentation on redistribution might also be negative irrespective of alignment status, 4 < 0; 5 < 0; because low levels of fragmentation facilitate credit-claiming for deputies that are electorally dominant in a given county.
It also seems plausible that, at least in the Brazilian context, the payo¤ to the central government takes on other forms not included in the Khemani model, such as kickbacks from local o¢ cials [Samuels, 2002] . As a result, the central government might be willing to send additional funds to non-aligned local governments even if it cannot claim any political credit for the resulting public service improvements at the local level. If relatively unpopular local executives are willing to pay a higher price for additional central government transfers one might expect to see a negative correlation between redistribution and the mayor's vote share, irrespective of alignment, i.e. 2 < 0; 3 < 0.
More generally, local governments in Brazil might not be as passive as depicted in the formal models discussed above. In particular, local executives have strong electoral motives for seeking additional funds from the center. While electoral rules at the time prohibited mayors from seeking consecutive terms they were allowed to run again after skipping a term and many of them did so successfully. It is also likely that incumbent mayors had some interest in maintaining the local elite in power even if they themselves had to take a break from o¢ ce. If better managed local governments (with presumably higher electoral support) were more likely to be successful in obtaining funds from the center (not least because of electoral clout in national elections) one would expect a positive correlation between party popularity at the local level and central government transfers received, i.e. 3 > 0. Grossman [1994] provides a formalization of this idea.
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Khemani's model also predicts 1 = 0 and is ambiguous about the sign of 2 : Arretche and Rodden's discussion on the other hand would predict 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 because aligned deputies are more likely to be involved in the president's legislative coalition than non-aligned deputies, irrespective of the mayor's party a¢ liation.
The prediction 1 > 0 and 2 > 0 also results from the ADDD model if voters give credit for public spending increases also to national deputies in addition to crediting local executives. This assumption is reasonable for the vast majority of small to medium sized Brazilian local governments which derive most of their …nancing from upper levels of government as discussed in section 2.1. From the central government's perspective, both high right-wing vote shares in congressional contests and right-wing local executives ensure that most political credit for redistributed bene…ts goes to aligned politicians.
Finally, ADDD's model would predict 4 > 3 > 0 since swing, i.e. highly fragmented, constituencies are more attractive targets the less likely it is that non-aligned politicians are able to take credit for spending increases. This in turn is least likely when the rightwing vote share is high and the local executive's party a¢ liation is aligned with the center.
As pointed out in section 2.2, there might have been more subtle manipulations of the program prior to 1991, which left the distribution of population estimates smooth at the cuto¤s. Unfortunately, electoral data for the 1987-1990 congressional session are not readily available. The analysis presented here is thus only concerned with the 1991 manipulation which had the most persistent e¤ect on the distribution of transfers during the years to come. Column 4 tests whether counties that voted for right-wing deputies in the previous congressional elections were treated even more favorably in fragmented local party systems as ADDD's model would predict. The positive and statistically signi…cant point estimates of 3 and 4 suggest that among right-wing counties, highly fragmented constituencies were more attractive targets than less fragmented constituencies, irrespective of the mayor's party a¢ liation. This disaggregation of the right-wing bias also shows that the puzzling favoritism of electorally fragmented non-aligned counties found in columns 1 through 3 was driven entirely by counties which also supported right-wing deputies.
Estimation results
Among counties with a high right-wing vote share of say 0.8, a 2 standard deviation difference in interparty fragmentation (0.28) leads to a …ctional population gain of about 1000, irrespective of county alignment.
Column 5 shows that these results are robust to the inclusion of other county covariates that might be correlated with electoral outcomes, such as county income per capita or average education levels. Overall, the pattern of results suggests that right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties were the main bene…ciaries of the program manipulation. To the extent that political fragmentation proxies for swing constituencies, 23 these results are consistent with the "aligned swing" prediction of ADDD's model. Table VII reports Although right-wing support in congressional elections (column 3) is still associated with a higher bracket error, the e¤ects are not statistically signi…cant under this speci…cation.
Moreover it appears that the interaction e¤ect between party fragmentation and rightwing support is now more than twice as large among aligned counties compared to nonaligned counties, as found in table VII as well. Again, the magnitudes are not statistically di¤erent from each other (p-value=0.27 ). One di¤erence with the previous speci…cations is that mayor alignment per se, 1 , now seems to matter statistically, although only marginally so.
One advantage of the bracket error speci…cation is that it is easier to interpret whether 
Conclusion
In this paper I have presented evidence that even a rule-based transfer program anchored in the constitution and in the national tax code and based on apparently technocratic inputs can be circumvented and manipulated for political gain. Speci…cally, the …ndings suggest that the manipulation was economically important and there is robust evidence that the main bene…ciaries were right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties. Under the assumption that political fragmentation proxies for swing constituencies, these results are consistent with the "aligned swing" prediction of ADDD's model.
There is also some evidence that aligned local executives were targeted with FPM transfers which would be consistent with predictions from the Khemani and ADDD models.
While these results are suggestive of political interference there are two main caveats to the analysis presented here. The …rst is that it is remains possible that the correlations reported above su¤er from omitted variable bias and/or speci…cation error. The second caveat is that the detected e¤ects might only be the tip of the iceberg. For example, bureaucrats may have simply bumped up those counties which paid the highest bribes [Shleifer and Vishny, 1993] . This type of corruption would be exceedingly hard to detect 25 in the data. It is also conceivable that counties that were bumped up were part of in ‡uential federal politicians'networks [Fisman, 2001] . In exchange for funds transferred under the FPM, federal politicians likely received monetary kickbacks which they used to …nance their campaign spending and cultivate their personal vote. Counties that are in the network may not be the counties that provided most electoral support for federal politicians, however [Samuels, 2002] . As a result, the reported correlations between political conditions and manipulation of county population estimates might signi…cantly understate the true extent of patronage dealings.
There are also two main extensions to the analysis presented so far. The …rst is to 
